...the significance of [Libyan Foreign Minister] Kussa’s defection lies in its being a sign of the winds shifting against Qaddafi with his inner circle, which will affect the loyalty of his outer circle of tribal leaders. Many key members of the powerful Warfalla and Megarha tribes have already declared against Qaddafi, and Firjan and others are wavering. Tribes as loose systems of kinship politics, are volatile and fluid, and their allegiances can change rapidly. (Americans might remember that many members of the Dulaim tribe in Iraq fought tooth and nail against US troops in 2004-2005 but by 2006-2007 many were joining pro-American militias, the ‘Sons of Iraq.’) The tribes could turn on Qaddafi in a second, aside from his own and a few loyalists.
In announcing the end of US bombing raids in Libya, Gates “noted that the air attacks are a central feature of the overall military strategy; over time they could degrade Gadhafi’s firepower to a point that he would be unable to put down a renewed uprising by opposition forces…”
That is, Gates hopes that over time, Col. Muammar Qaddafi will simply have fewer and fewer tanks, artillery pieces, and armored vehicles. He has already lost the ability to bomb Benghazi and other cities from the air.
Gates’s premise seems to be that most Libyans don’t want to be under Qaddafi’s rule, and that the only way he subdued Zuara, Zawiya, Tajoura, Ra’s Lanuf, and other cities that had thrown him off was by main force. When his main force is subjected to sufficient attrition, his advantage will suddenly disappear and the opposition to him of the liberation movement will suddenly cascade. I don’t personally think that this cascade requires military means. It happened once largely peacefully, as in Egypt in Tunisia, and can happen again if Qaddafi’s heavy weapons can be neutralized.
People who want the attrition of Qaddafi’s forces to be visited in only a week or two are just being unrealistic. It would happen over weeks and maybe months.
In the meantime, the UN allies (NATO and the Arab League) have as their most urgent mission the protection of Benghazi from any major attack, which can be done aerially.
What bad thing would happen if NATO and the Arab League just proceed deliberately and with patience?
Impatience makes for bad policy. Those who urge Western military troops the ground are making a huge error– that development would never be acceptable to most of the Libyan people nor to the Arab League, nor to the majority on the UN Security Council.
Others of the tribe of the impatient want to put sophisticated weapons in rebel hands. Those who think the US or NATO should arm the rebels, however, are simply paving the way for a civil war and for a long-term cycle of violence. Having a rebel army conquer reluctant cities like Sirt, which still support Qaddafi in the main, is undesirable. Let pro-Qaddafi cities alone. The main task should be to protect the anti-Qaddafi populace from his attacks.
NATO agrees. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said Thursday that his organization differs with those who have suggested that UNSC Resolution 1973 allows the arming of the rebels.
Like with Tunisia, Egypt and Iran (eventually), the lack of hands-on American involvement is actually a good thing. Give the Rebels a fighting chance to do it themselves. Don't arm the rebels...why? Because once you hand one of your allies a gun, that gun don't magically disappear when the mission is over. Guns don't melt into the sand by force of will. Guns, history has shown, tend to stick around. Anyone can pick up that thing, and possibly use it against you (see: Bin-Laden, Usama).
Keep Qaddafi weak. Give the Rebels their chance. Let the tribes finish him off. It won't happen overnight oh ye of convenient short-term memory loss, but it will happen.
UPDATE: 11:10am Pacific: Thomas Ricks has a quick column on why the U.S. arming the rebels is a bad idea, and I'd like to post a reminder that the Administration hasn't made up its mind yet, and it's pretty unlikely to do so as of this morning.
